In its concluding observations for Cyprus, the UN CRPD Committee stated that it "is concerned about the insufficiency of legal provisions and accessible mechanisms to detect, report, prevent and combat all forms of violence". 
Introduction
In spring 2017, the United Nations (UN) Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Committee), which monitors the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) by the States Parties, in its concluding observations found that Cyprus had not implemented Article 16 CRPD:
The Committee is concerned about the insufficiency of legal provisions and accessible mechanisms to detect, report, prevent and combat all forms of violence, including sexual violence in private and public spheres against persons with disabilities, including children (CRPD/C/CYP/CO/1: par. 39).
The Committee also proceeded to recommend that the State of Cyprus: Building on the Committee's recommendation to strengthen and implement legislation to provide monitoring and reporting mechanisms, this paper also makes recommendations for measures that the Government of Cyprus could take in order to achieve the implementation of This provision places an obligation on States Parties to have independent monitoring authorities, to effectively monitor all their facilities and programmes that are designed to serve persons with disabilities, so as to prevent all forms of abuse, violence and exploitation.
In accordance with Article 16(3) CRPD the authorities designated with the independent monitoring obligation need to meet certain requirements: (1) they must be authorised to monitor all facilities, that is, both State and privately-run facilities; (2) they need to operate within a CRPD human rights framework; and (3) they must be independent (CRPD 2006: Art. 16(3)).
Concerning the third requirement, the term 'independent', the wording employed in Article 16(3) CRPD is that of "… effectively monitored by independent authorities" (italics, my emphasis). This wording is similar to the text of Article 33(2) CRPD, which reads:
… independent mechanisms, … shall take into account the principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights (CRPD 2006: Art. 33 (2) CRPD, these principles can be referred to as guidance in interpreting the 'independence' criterion for the designated independent monitoring authority.
The Paris Principles set out the characteristics national human rights institutions (NHRIs) are required to meet (UNGA 1993b). These state that: the body must have the authority to promote and protect universal human rights, and should have a broad a mandate as possible concerning the protection and promotion of human rights set out in domestic legislation or Constitution (UNGA 1993b; de Beco and Murray 2014) . The body's independence must also be guaranteed by statute or the State's Constitution, and it should have adequate resources so as not to be dependent on and subject to governmental control; there must also be a mandate for the appointment of its staff, and staff must not be seconded or re-deployed (UNGA 1993b; ICC 2013; de Beco and Murray 2014) . The body must be pluralist and representative; it must be somewhere between a governmental and non-governmental actor, and its composition must allow the participation of human rights' non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (UNGA 1993b; de Beco and Murray 2014) . Lastly, the body must have adequate powers of investigation (UNGA 1993b; ICC 2013) .
The Insufficient Implementation of Article 16(3) CRPD in Cyprus
Cyprus signed the CRPD in 2007 and ratified it in 2011. Six years after ratifying and 10 years after signing the CRPD, the UN CRPD Committee found that Cyprus had insufficiently implemented Article 16(3) CRPD (CRPD/C/CYP/CO/1). At the domestic level, examination of Cyprus's State Report to the UN CRPD Committee (prepared by Cyprus's designated focal point for the CRPD (Art. 33(1)) revealed that no measures had been taken and that none infighting between staff were also reported (Lemesos 2016; Liberal 2016a 
Examination of the Current Domestic Monitoring Framework
Given the concerns about the insufficient implementation of Article 16 by the UN CRPD (CPMRP 2014; IAPT 2014; SWS 2014a; OCAPHR 2015; Symeonidou 2015) .
In this section I examine these three bodies to identify their possible relationship to the Article 16(3) CRPD requirements.
The Social Welfare Services
The Social Welfare Services (SWS), is a Ministry of Labour, Welfare and Social Insurance Commissioner's report concluded that there is an absence of satisfactory structures for the provision of comprehensive care to persons with disabilities, including intellectual disabilities, leading to "extremely adverse consequences for these persons and their families" (IAPT 2012b: par. 15). The Commissioner requested that staff undergo further training so that they would be able to respond to individuals' particular support needs (IAPT 2012b); and considered this matter "particularly serious" and that it would be a subject of the Commissioner's future interventions (IAPT 2012b). Deep concern was also expressed that the current legislative framework does not provide for the necessary deprivation of liberty safeguarding processes that should be followed when a person is accepted into a shelter Table   with a summary of the characteristics of the SWS, the Committee, and IAPT, can be found at the end of this article).
National Human Rights Institutions
In addition to the three existing monitoring mechanisms, there are also two national human rights institutions (NHRIs), which may be relevant to the existing monitoring framework, these are the:
1. National Independent Human Rights Authority (NIHRA); and
Independent Authority for the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (IAPRPD).
In (2)), it is noted that it has not been designated the role of independent monitoring mechanism (Art. 16 (3)).
In view of the Article 16(3) CRPD requirements, the IAPRPD is able to investigate The CRPD text is only available in the six UN official languages, 6 it therefore had to be translated into an official Government Greek language CRPD text before it was incorporated into domestic law. (2)) and created the IAPRPD as independent mechanism.
Elsewhere it has been argued that the authorities for Articles 33(2) and 16(3) CRPD should also be monitoring places of detention concerning disability issues; this raises issues of potential duplication of monitoring roles under OPCAT, requiring careful co-ordination between the relevant designated bodies (Laing and Murray 2013a) . In the Cypriot context, the IAPRPD (independent mechanism) and the IAPT (NPM) are both part of the Office of the Commissioner for Administration, therefore coordination between the IAPRPD and IAPT should more easily be managed. In turn, the work of these two bodies could be complemented, shared and coordinated, together with a renewed role for the Committee, with the three bodies (IAPRPD, IAPD and the Committee) forming the independent monitoring has been argued that in some cases it is undesirable for the broad range of OPCAT monitoring activities to be undertaken by a single body (Laing and Murray 2013b) . However, it is noted that since the CQC's inception in 2009, it needed to merge three organisations, 8 which also had the implication that it had to adjust its monitoring with a new set of standards (Francis Inquiry 2013; THF 2018) . Secondly, in England, the CQC is authorised to inspect publicly funded services and institutions (Laing 2017) , including where these are privately-run (Steinerte et al 2012) . Whereas in Cyprus, the SWS is authorised to This is in contrast with the Committee, which does not have the authority to take any effective enforcement action against State or private facilities, as neither does the IAPT, although it may submit recommendations to the responsible authorities. Fourthly, the CQC and Cyprus' IAPT are both respectively designated as NPMs (Laing 2017) . Lastly, a common limitation to both States, is that none of their bodies appear to satisfy the independence criteria in view of the Paris Principles. This is as the CQC does not enjoy the financial and operational independence levels required by the Paris Principles (Laing 2017) . Overall, it is unfortunately observed that although England has designated the CQC, in contrast to Cyprus that has yet to designate an independent monitoring mechanism, it continues to face challenges in preventing instances of violence and abuse at facilities designed to serve persons with intellectual disabilities.
Areas in Need of

Lessons for States Parties to the CRPD
Article 16(3) CRPD is a significant provision that requires immediate action by States Parties. It is important that when States Parties, such as Cyprus, Armenia, Canada, Chile, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, Guatemala, Lithuania, Moldova, Serbia and Uganda, are in the process of developing or re-visiting their CRPD implementation strategies, that the requisite attention is granted to the Article 16(3) independent monitoring obligation, in order to ensure that measures are taken towards its implementation, and that it is not side-lined or forgotten. Secondly, in designating or establishing a body to the task of independent monitoring authority, the Paris Principles should be used as guidance to ensure that the monitoring body meets with all the requirements required by Article 16(3) CRPD. Thirdly, where there is more than one body designated with the role of independent monitoring authority under Article 16(3), processes for cooperation and coordination should be put in place forming part of the independent monitoring framework. Lastly, where a pre-CRPD body is designated with the responsibility for Article 16(3), it is critically important that the mandate and framework within which the body is to operate, is situated within a CRPD human rights framework (and not that of a 'traditional' (pre-CRPD) human rights framework). The designation should also be accompanied by training for staff on the 
